Voting Cycles投票周期

Condorcet's Rule and Voting Cycles 孔多的规则和表决循环

Less than 10% of simulated elections lead to a chance voting cycle when there are 4 options spread among 200 voters.只有不到10 ％的模拟选举导致循环投票的机会时，有4个选项中传播200选民。 But on a small council with 3 factions, inadvertent ties are fairly common.但是，在一个小安理会3派别，无意中关系是相当普遍的。 And manipulators of Condorcet's rule try to create voting cycles.孔及操作手的规则尝试创建投票周期。

Voters can often forge a cycle by ranking the central item below an opposition item. 选民往往可以形成一个周期的排名低于中央项目反对派项目。 In our first example C was a Condorcet winner.在我们的例子 C是一孔赢家。 But if Uri changes his ballot to rank C below D , we find a voting cycle in which D beats C , C beats B , and B beats D .但是，如果我们改变了投票，以下面 C级开发 ，我们发现有投票权的周期，其中D节拍的C ， C 比B和乙节拍D 。 Each wins by 4 ballots to 3.每个WINS的4张选票，以3 。

Table 1c表1c 7 Ballots 7搅珠 4 Ranks 4队伍 Uri开放 Nic网卡 Mo密苏里 Lil律 Kit试剂盒 Jo赵 Gil吉尔 1st第一 2nd第二 3rd第三 4th第四 A 字母a B 乙 D D C ç B 乙 C ç A 字母a D D B 乙 C ç D D A 字母a C ç B 乙 D D A 字母a D D C ç B 乙 A 字母a D D C ç A 字母a B 乙 D D A 字母a C ç B 乙

Table 2c,  Pairwise Tests of 4 Candidates表2C型，配对试验的4名学员
	Votes Against票反对
	A字母a	B乙	C ç	D D
for A为A	- -	3 3	2 2	2 2	2 prefer A over D. 2喜欢超过4
for B为B	4 4	- -	3 3	4 4	4 prefer B over D. 4倾向于乙超过4
for C对C	5 5	4 4		3 3	3 now prefer C over D. 3现在喜欢ç超过4
for D的D	5 5	3 3	4 4	- -	4 now prefer D over C. 4比现在更喜欢D角

Click a number in table 2c to check which ballots contribute to it. 点击一些表型检查的选票作出贡献。
Or click a ballot to highlight the candidate totals it helps.或点击投票，以突出的候选人总数帮助。
Click here to reset the ballots and the Condorcet pairwise table. 点击这里重置选票和孔成对就座 。

You can see that there are many different majorities even in this small group with 7 voters.  Proposals B, C, and D each win a majority; so it is not accurate to claim any of them win the majority.你可以看到有许多不同的多数即使在这个小团体7选民。提案的B ， C和D各赢得多数席位，因此它是不准确的要求任何人赢得多数。

Conspiring to create a cycle is hard and risky in a large, diverse electorate with many candidates.阴谋建立一个周期的努力，在一个大的风险，不同的选民有许多候选人。 But the examples above and below show it can be easy in a council with a handful of factions.但是，上面和下面的例子显示，可以很容易在安理会少数派别。

If option B is the most central, supporters of moderate-left A may add their support to those who sincerely rank the right-wing C above B , helping C to beat B .如果选择B是最核心，支持中等留下了可能会增加他们的支持，这些谁真诚排名右翼上文 C 乙 ，帮助C至击败乙 。

Conspirators risk enacting their least favorite policy.阴谋风险颁布的最不喜欢的政策。 If, for example, supporters of C miscalculate and try to create a cycle by adding their support to A , she wins.举例来说，如果支持者的 C打错算盘，并尝试建立一个周期，增加其支持一个，她的胜利。

Thus strategic voters can manipulate Condorcet's rule to end indecisively in a voting cycle.因此战略的选民可以操纵孔的统治结束indecisively中具有投票权的周期。 But they cannot manipulate it to elect their preferred option nor to eliminate the 1 which would be the Condorcet winner if they cast sincere ballots.但他们不能对其进行操作，以选出他们的优先选择，也没有消除1这将是孔得主如果他们真诚地投下选票。 That option is always one of those tied in the top voting cycle or "Smith Set".该选项始终是其中的一个并列最高投票周期或“史密斯集” 。

To resolve voting cycles, the by-laws may send a voting cycle to further discussion and vote trading; to tabling the motion or dividing it into parts; to a tie-breaking vote by the chairperson or a " Condorcet-completion rule ", an alternative way to tally the preference ballots.要解决投票周期，附例可发送投票周期，以进一步讨论和表决的交易;以提交议案或分裂成零件;到了并列一票由主席或“ 孔完成规则 ” ，一个替代的方法统计的优惠票。

Blake Cretney's web site is the place to learn Tideman's Ranked Pairs and Schulze's布莱克Cretney的网站是为了解泰德曼的排行双和舒尔茨的 Beat Path completion rules.击败路径完成规则。 These elect the Condorcet winner when there is one and break voting cycles without creating much opportunity for manipulation.这些选举冠军孔时有一个周期，打破投票没有创造很多机会操纵。 Another manipulation-resistant rule breaks voting cycles using Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), LOR1 is detailed next.另一个操纵性规则休息投票循环使用即时径流投票 （通气） ， LOR1是详细的下一步。