7(;3 <..////<0-0-0-050E0[0[$0x00 1/1F*1p/.c4. Electoral Process Photo-collage Front cover Poli Sci Journal: CSTV: Condorcet - Single Transferable Vote, The Least Manipulable Rule for Electing the Candidate Whose Support is Broadest The Most Reliable Rule for Electing the Candidate Whose Support is Broadest? Public Choice: CSTV: A New Voting System with Low Manipulability to Produce High Condorcet and Utility Efficiencies in Practice. CSTV: A New Voting System, Elects the Most Broadly Supported Candidate and is . . . CSTV: Condorcet or Successive Eliminations CSTV: A NEW VOTING SYSTEM Rarely Manipulable, Reliably Elects the Candidate Whose Support is Broadest CCE Condorcet - Candidate Elimination, CSE Condorcet - Successive Elimination, CPV Condorcet Preferrencial Vote. (MCE, MSE, or MPV = Hare.) Dodgson = CBC: Condorcet -Ballot Elimination/Change. Kemeny = CRC: Condorcet -Rank Changes. Condorcet - Single Transferable Vote, The Least Manipulable Rule for Electing the Candidate Whose Support is Broadest Robert B. Loring to my father William C. Loring II This work would not have been possible without generous support in kind and in spirit from Bill Sanderson, Micheal and Cat Thompson, Don Heyrich, Catie Mains, Dan Neelands and especially Bill Loring. Computer spreadsheets to calculate CSTV are available for $5.(US) from the author. Please specify MS-DOS or Macintosh disk format. size and spreed sheet Lotus 123, Excel, SYLK. Robert B. Loring Robert B. Loring 5911 Springfield Dr. 5114 Sunset Beach Drive Bethesda, MD 20816 Olympia, WA 98502 USA USA (301) 229-9043 (206) 866-1619 1990 by Robert B. Loring all rights reserved printed on recycled paper [ The following publishers have generously given permission to use extended quotations from copyrighted works: From Topics in the Theory of Voting by P.D. Straffin. Copyrighted 1980 by UMAP. Reprinted by permission of UMAP. From Making Multi-candidate Elections More Democratic by Samuel Merrill. Copyrighted 1988 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. From Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions by J. R. Chamberlin and J. L. Cohen. Copyrighted 1978 by American Political Science Review. Reprinted by permission of American Political Science Review. FromSocial Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association, by J. R. Chamberlin, J. L. Cohen, and C. H. Coombs. Copyrighted 1984 by Journal of Politics. Reprinted by permission of Journal of Politics. From Public Choice 2 by Dennis Mueller. Copyrighted 1989 by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.] Contents decimal tab Contents Abstract v Preface v Introduction to Voting-System Theory vi Basic Parts of CSTV Rank-order ballots 1 Condorcets criterion 2 Alternative vote 3 CSTV 3 Do it yourself worksheets 4 CSTV Compared with MSTV (Hare) CSTV winners versus MSTV winners 5 Squeeze effect by chance or manipulation 5 Manipulation of both CSTV and MSTV 6 Non-monotonicity by chance or manipulation 7 Comparisons with Other Voting Systems Definitions 10 Condorcet efficiencyies 11 Utility efficiencyies 12 Utility efficiency estimate for CSTV 13 Distributions of Winners [@ Effects of Vtg Sys] 14 Manipulations 14 Punishing the leading candidate with last-place votes 14 Frequency of manipulable elections 15 Irrelevant alternatives 17 Sensitivity to incomplete ballots 20 Some Effects and Uses of Voting Systems Ballots and Information costs 23 Utility ballots versus rank-order ballots 23 Condorcet efficiencys effects 24 Manipulations effects 24 Effects and Uses of CSTV 25 The Functions of Voting for Governance breadth of rep versus collestive action Legitimacy Representation PR, PA, PO, Distributions Stability CSTV pres & cabinet Questions on Diversity CSF Uses of CSTV Single-seat districts 26 Multi-seat districts 27 Summary and Recommendations 28 Conclusions Recommendations 28 Appendix Glossary defining of words used in voting theory 30 Blank ballots and worksheets 32 Computer spreadsheet to calculate CSTV 34 References 35 Photo of ballot counters? Should I say graph 1 instead of figure 1? Capitalize example? Illustrations Electoral Process Photo-collage Front cover Figure 1. An Australian Ballot 1 Figure 2. A Candidate Squeeze 5 Figures 3 to 11 Winners Nearness to the Center of the Electorate 21 Figures 12 to 20. Distributions of Voters and Candidates 33 Electoral Process Cartoons Back cover. Examples Example i Agenda Cycling vi Example 1. A Voting Cycle 2 Example 2. Alternative Vote Eliminates a Candidate 3 Example 3. A Cycle and Squeeze 6 Example 4. Non-monotonicity in CSTV and MSTV 8 Example 5. Non-monotonicity for MSTV but not for CSTV 9 Example 6. Punishing Vote Strategy 11 Example 7. Republicans Split Democrats North & South 15 Tables Table 1. Frequencies of Majority and Condorcet Winners 8 Tables 2 and 3. Manipulability 13 Table 4. Violations of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 14 Table 5. Violations of Subset Rationality 16 Table 6. Sensitivity to Methods of Filling Incomplete Ballots 17 Tables 7 and 8.9 Condorcet Efficiencies 9 if Ch & F rptd Con efs 18 Table 9. Utility Efficiencies 19 Table 10. Nearness to the Center of the Theoretical Electorate 20  vz{*zST 1 1 0 0 - ##" h" d" _"['"m""","" """"'"'" " ")" %" """_"["h"m""d"  "% ############## # # ### # # #(# 0"# ###### ######## ##################################################################### ############# ##########QX wwwwQ%G X"D'#"D'#  """"Q0S X"P0#"L-# UUUUQO`r X"le,# "i~(# """"Q+M0 X"E'#"G+*# """"QM<p] X"g>"#"mU$#@@#hh`ui]%ɡ@נ١@@pusPstvy|}zwvuuuvwz } +48<CIMO@٠ס@@"Ohh`qO%ɡ@נ١@@p~zCz|!).17<@B@٠ס@@"Bhh`{I%ɡ@נ١@@p~>&*-28;=@٠ס@@"=hh` @%ɡ@נ١@@p~6 !$'+/45@٠ס@@"5hh`1%ɡ@נ١@@p~) !$'(@٠ס@@"(hh`%%ɡ@נ١@@p~ @٠ס@@"hh`%ɡ@נ١@@p~  @٠ס@@" hh`%ɡ@נ١@@pN  @٠ס@@" hh`%ɡ@נ١@@pN@٠נ y 16 Table 6. Sensitivity to Methods of Filling Incomplete Ballots 17 Tables 7 and 8.9 Condorcet Efficiencies 9 if Ch & F rptd Con efs 18 Table 9. Utility Efficiencies 19 Table 10. 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